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Letting Statutory Tails Wag Constitutional DogsHave the Bivens Dissenters Prevailed?
GEORGE D. BRowN*

INTRODUCTION

Under the doctrine of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, persons whose constitutional rights have been violated
by a federal official may sue that official for damages in a federal court
even though no statute directly authorizes such suits. Nine years after Bivens
was decided, then-Justice Rehnquist urged the Court to overrule it, denouncing it as "a decision 'by a closely divided court, unsupported by the
confirmation of time.' ' 2 As an initial matter Justice Rehnquist's attack
seems surprising, even inaccurate. Six Justices voted to allow the damages
remedy in Bivens itself. 3 In the next two cases raising the issue the Court
was, except for Justice Rehnquist's single dissent, essentially unanimous in
upholding the validity of Bivens actions. 4 Furthermore, Bivens makes sense.
It creates symmetry within the legal system by placing plaintiffs who claim
damages from constitutional violations by federal officials on the same
footing as plaintiffs with similar claims against state and local officials. The

* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. A.B., 1961, Harvard College; LL.B.,
1965, Harvard Law School. The author wishes to thank Boston College Law School for the
research grant which made this article possible.
1. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
2. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 32 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Kovacs
v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
3. Justice Brennan wrote for a majority of five. Justice Harlan wrote a separate opinion
concurring in the judgment. 403 U.S. at 398.
4. In Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), the issue was whether a discharged
congressional employee could bring a Bivens action based on the fifth amendment. In an
opinion by Justice Brennan, five members of the Court held that she could. Justice Powell's
dissent, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, accepted the legitimacy of
Bivens. Id. at 252. He relied primarily on considerations of comity towards Congress in
denying relief to the particular plaintiff. Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion also relied
on this consideration, see id. at 249 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), while Justice Stewart relied on
the speech or debate clause of the Constitution. See id. at 251 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Carlson
involved a Bivens claim under the eighth amendment by the estate of a deceased federal
prisoner. Justice Brennan wrote for a majority of five in an opinion allowing the action.
Justices Powell and Stewart concurred separately. 446 U.S. at 25. Chief Justice Burger dissented
on the ground that the Federal Tort Claims Act precluded the remedy. Id. at 30. However,
he accepted, somewhat grudgingly, the validity of Bivens. Id. Only Justice Rehnquist challenged
the basic validity of Bivens. Id. at 31.
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latter may sue under section 1983 of Title 42.5 While there is no similar
statutory authorization for Bivens actions-indeed, this was the nub of the
controversy in that case6-granting a Bivens remedy places the federal courts,
which already have jurisdiction, in the not unfamiliar position of enforcing7
the Constitution and of doing so through a traditional form of legal action.
Today, however, Justice Rehnquist's 1980 critique has the ring of prophecy. Four times in the last six years the Court has held Bivens actions
unavailable8 and has intimated that a similar result should be reached in
remanding a fifth case to a circuit court. 9 A key element considered in the
recent cases has been congressional action providing some form of relief
for the conduct complained of. 10 Although the Court purports to follow
Bivens, the themes which predominate are those which the dissenters in that
case advanced: that when it comes to determining how best to remedy
constitutional violations by federal officials, Congress' institutional capacity
is superior to that of the judiciary and that, indeed, the entire issue is
essentially legislative in nature. 1
The Court may insist that Bivens is alive and well, but one has to wonder,
and worry. The criticism advanced in this article is not so much with the
results-although the outcome in United States v. Stanley,12 for instance, is
a little hard to take"3-as with how the Court gets there. One may agree
with the Court's reservations about judicial lawmaking, its concern for the
doctrine of separation of powers and its general views about the superior

5. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress....
6. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 406 (Harlan, J., concurring), 427 (Black, J., dissenting).
7. See id. at 407-09 (Harlan, J., concurring).
8. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 108 S. Ct. 2460 (1988); United States v. Stanley, 107 S. Ct.
3054 (1987); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
9. In Cooper v. Kotarski, 108 S. Ct. 2861 (1988), the circuit court held a Bivens remedy
available to a federal employee in a probationary supervisor position. The Supreme Court
vacated and remanded this decision for reconsideration in light of Chilicky.
10. E.g., Bush, 462 U.S. at 381-88 (describing and emphasizing remedies available to federal
civil service employees). In Stanley, however, the Court suggested that the Constitution's
conferral upon Congress of plenary authority over the military is enough by itself to preclude
Bivens actions. 107 S. Ct. at 3063. The Court also mentioned, however, "Congress' activity
in the field." Id. (quoting Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304). The Court suggested that although
Congress had not created any relevant remedy for the injuries suffered, this was irrelevant to
the analysis. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. at 3063.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 80-108.
12. 107 S. Ct. 3054.
13. Id. In Stanley, an ex-serviceman who had unknowingly "volunteered" for -experiments
involving the effects of L.S.D. was held to be without a Bivens remedy against either military
or civilian officials. On the facts of the case, no other remedy was available either. Id.
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institutional competence of Congress. These positions, "conservative" positions if a label is helpful, should not be determinative in the Bivens context.
The basic question is availability of judicial relief for constitutional violations. In the recent cases the statutory tail comes to wag the constitutional
dog. That is, the Court's emphasis on the statutory component of the
remedial issues tends to obscure and downgrade their constitutional dimension. It is as if the whole problem involved only the judiciary's role in an
article I legislative scheme. 14 Yet the Bivens doctrine deals with judicial
enforcement of rights whose origin is outside of, and hierarchically superior
to, any statute. Transmuting these matters into legislative ones calls into
question the existence of any independent judicial power to remedy constitutional violations, at least through damages actions. The lack of such a
power was the ultimate conclusion of the Bivens dissenters. To some extent,
then, the recent cases represent a vindication of this position.
This article examines these developments critically, but also with a recognition that concurrent judicial and legislative power over Bivens remedies
presents serious problems of its own. The article begins with a re-examination of the Bivens dissents and of Chief Justice Rehnquist's subsequent
reformulation of their theses. It also explores the ambiguities in the decision
itself-in particular the Court's refusal to place Bivens on a purely constitutional footing, as well as the Court's admission of a substantial legislative
role in remedying constitutional violations and its expression of judicial
deference to legislative choices. The article then examines the extent to
which the current Court's analyses rest on the dissenters' premises. I criticize
two of these premises: that Congress' institutional competence in remedial
matters is so superior to that of the courts as to warrant almost automatic
deference; and that, indeed, the issues are so much more legislative than
judicial in character that any congressional action ousts the courts.
As noted, this approach tends to obscure the constitutional dimensions
of the Bivens problem. Another result of the recent cases is to break down
the initial symmetry between Bivens and section 1983. I argue against taking
this development as far as the Court has, even if one accepts the argument
that separation of powers considerations call for greater judicial restraint
14. See Steinman, Backing off Bivens and the Ramifications of this Retreat for the
Vindication of FirstAmendment Rights, 83 MIcH. L. REv. 269, 291-94 (1984) (Court in Bush
emphasized Congress' role in federal personnel policy). I agree with much of Professor
Steinman's analysis. However, she "assumes the constitutional power of federal courts to
recognize damage remedies for the violation of constitutional rights by federal agents"-that
is, that Bivens itself has stood the test of time. Id. at 272-73 n.22. I believe that the recent
decisions place even this assumption in question. Professor Steinman does note that the
"fundamental constitutional issue still may not have been laid to rest to the satisfaction of all
present members of the Court." Id. For another critique of pre-Stanley developments, see
Note, Two Approaches to Determine Whether an Implied Cause of Action Under the Constitution is Necessary: The Changing Scope of the Bivens Action, 19 GA. L. REv. 683 (1985)
[hereinafter Georgia Note].
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in the Bivens context than do federalism considerations in the section 1983
context. Congressional power can be respected without judicial abdication.
Finally, I explore the relationships between the current Court's Bivens
decisions and an important recent development in federal courts scholarship:
the thesis that all forms of judicial lawmaking by federal courts-whether
presented as constitutional adjudication, statutory interpretation or federal
common law-are essentially the same and should be placed under the
general rubric of federal common law.' 5
A centerpiece of this general thesis is the contention that courts should
take the same approach both to allowing Bivens remedies under the Constitution and to implying private rights of action from federal statutes which
do not provide for one. I argue that Bivens cases highlight the difference
between remedial questions when the source of the right is a statute and
when the source is the Constitution. The generalist thesis, because of its
very need to be general, obscures these differences. Moreover, it creates a
somewhat odd alliance between academic advocates of a liberal approach
to federal common law and a conservative Court bent on limiting it. One
doubts that this is what the proponents of the new federal common law
had in mind.
I.

Tim BIVENS DISSENTS AND THE CURRENT COURT'S ACCEPTANCE
OF THEiR PREMISES
A.

The Dissents' Principal Themes

At issue in Bivens' 6 was whether the Court could authorize damages as a
remedy for constitutional violations by federal officials. Congress had
enacted no federal analogue to section 1983. The three dissenters (Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Black and Blackmun) 7 argued that the Court
could not proceed on its own without such authorization. Three themes
stood out. The first, articulated by Chief Justice Burger, was that the
decision whether or not to grant a remedy involved choices which Congress
was in a better position to make because of its superior institutional
competence.'" He saw the Bivens case as part of the larger problem of
remedying fourth amendment violations by officials at all levels of government. 19 A broad-scale solution involving the creation of administrative

15. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HLv. L. REv. 881
(1986); Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. Cm. L. REv. 1 (1985).
16. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
17. Id. at 411 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 427 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 430
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
18. Id. at 412 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
19. Id. at 412-24. The Chief Justice's general emphasis was on the shortcomings of the
exclusionary rule. However, he doubted that the Bivens action would be an adequate substitute.
Id. at 421-22.
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remedies could only come from a legislative body.20 However, even the
narrow step taken in Bivens was seen by the dissenters as requiring "careful
study and weighing of the arguments both for and against the creation of
21
such a remedy under the Fourth Amendment."
Beyond the issue of institutional competence lay the dissenters' major
theme: that the creation of the Bivens remedy was such an essentially
legislative task that only Congress could perform it. All three criticized the
decision on this ground, Justice Blackmun referring to it as "judicial
legislation,' "2 and Justice Black calling it "an exercise of power that the
Constitution does not give us." In part they saw the authorization of a
judicial remedy for constitutional wrongs as a decision about the allocation
of federal judicial resources among competing priorities, and thus as the
kind of balance-striking which belonged to the legislative branch.2 They
also seem to have viewed this authorization as the creation of a cause of
action, in other words the making of a law.Y Thus, the Court had trespassed
into the domain of Congress, violating the explicit wording of the Constitution as well as the doctrine of separation of powers.
A final theme was the effect of what Congress had already done, namely,
enact section 1983. This statute might be cited as tending to buttress
arguments that power to create such remedies lies with Congress. 26 Justice
Black went a step further and viewed it as "[a] strong inference

. .

.

that

'27
Congress does not desire to permit such suits against federal officials.
In other words, Congress had addressed the issue of judicial damages
remedies for wrongdoing by public officials and had drawn a line beyond
which the courts could not go.
None of the dissenters' arguments convinced the Bivens Court, although
one finds strong echoes of them in today's decisions. Even before these
decisions, however, the arguments against Bivens picked up a strong ally.

B.

Justice Rehnquist's Reformulation of the Anti-Bivens Position

In the decade following Bivens the Court extended it to claims under the
fifth amendment in Davis v. Passman2 and to claims under the eighth

20. Id. at 422-24.
21. Id. at 429 (Black, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 428 (Black, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 429 (Black, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 427 (Congress could create "a federal cause of action for damages."); see id.
at 411-12 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (Bivens "judicially creates a damage remedy not provided
for by the Constitution and not enacted by Congress.").
26. Id. at 427 (Black, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 429 (Black, J., dissenting).
28. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
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amendment in Carlson v. Green.29 These cases seemed to demonstrate general
acceptance and even solidification of the Bivens doctrine within the Court,
although there was disagreement over how to apply it.3o In Carlson, however,
Justice Rehnquist re-opened the basic question, called Bivens a "wrong
turn," and urged the Court to overrule it.31 To some extent his opinion
tracked those of the original dissenters. He presented the authorization of
Bivens remedies as a matter which was "not well suited for evaluation by
the Judicial Branch," '3 2 and which, indeed, belonged in the legislative domain
as a matter of separation of powers. 3 He also invoked section 1983 as
showing that Congress knew how to authorize remedies for violation of
34
constitutional rights if it wanted to.
An important new element in the Rehnquist dissent is his argument that
Congress had done more than simply enact section 1983: It had amended
the Federal Tort Claims Act to allow relief against the government for
individuals such as the Carlson plaintiff. Therefore even if the Bivens
remedy might provide the plaintiff with additional and more effective
relief-a point Justice Rehnquist was prepared to argue-the "dispositive"
fact for the Court should be that Congress had provided a remedial
mechanism which addressed the problem at hand.3 5 That problem he characterized as the Court's "creation of any tort remedies, constitutional or
otherwise." ' 36 The Court should not go beyond that scheme because "when
Congress creates and defines the limits of a cause of action, it has taken
into account competing considerations and struck what it considers to be
'37
an appropriate balance among them."
Justice Rehnquist also elaborates on the original dissenters' argument that
authorizing Bivens relief is a form of impermissible judicial lawmaking. He
begins with the unquestioned premise of Congress' tight control over thejurisdiction of the federal courts.38 Permitting Bivens actions, even though
it is characterized as a remedial issue, brings into federal courts a large

29. 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
30. Compare id. at 18-19 (Brennan, J.) (describing presumptive approach to availability of
Bivens actions) with id. at 26-29 (Powell, J., concurring) (criticizing majority for "absolute"
approach and calling for more judicial discretion). It should be noted that Justice Powell's
emphasis on separation of powers and his critique of "the Court's willingness to infer federal
causes of action that cannot be found in the Constitution or in a statute," id. at 29, cast
some doubt on his purported acceptance of Bivens.
31. Id. at 32 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 36.
33. Id. at 34, 38.
34. Id. at 35, 40.
35. Id. at 51.
36. Id.

37. Id. at 53 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 36-37.
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number of suits not contemplated by Congress. Thus it is, in part, a judicial
enlargement of federal court jurisdiction.3 9 Alternatively, Justice Rehnquist
attacks Bivens as a form of presumptively invalid federal common lawmaking. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkin 4 stands as a general bar to federal
common law. 41 Under Bivens, the federal courts perform-just such lawmaking by developing a body of remedial doctrines concerning types of damages,
compensable injuries, the question of intent and the availability of immunity
defenses. 42 Justice Rehnquist admitted that the presence of general federal
question jurisdiction was enough to authorize enforcement of the Constitution through equitable remedies. 43 He justified this apparent discrepancy
44
as a matter of historical tradition. His observation that Marbury v. Madison
4
5
itself "involved equitable relief by way of mandamus or injunction" may
suggest that equitable enforcement is part of the "original understanding"
about judicial review. In any event, the anti-Bivens arguments based on
notions of separation of powers are presented here in a far more developed
manner than in the original dissents.
Before considering the extent to which these arguments have prevailed in
the recent cases it is necessary to examine the extent to which Bivens itself
contains the seeds of its own destruction.
C.

The NonconstitutionalNature of Bivens and its Contemplation
of a Legislative Role

The main cause of what might be called the current Bivens problem, that
is, how to reconcile concurrent judicial and legislative power over remedies
for constitutional violations, is the Court's initial (and ongoing) failure to
spell out where the Bivens action stands within the legal system. Justice
Brennan wrote the Court's opinion. At the outset, let us consider how he
might have resolved the case: a straightforward analysis that the plaintiff
asserted a right under the Constitution, that the federal courts have jurisdiction over cases arising under the Constitution, and thus, that they have
the power and the duty to award damages if a compensable violation of
constitutional rights is shown. Period. In other words, just as the Court in

39. Id. at 37. For an early suggestion of this critique, see Bivens, 403 U.S. at 428 (Black,
J., dissenting).

40. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
41. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 37-38 ("Erie expressly rejected the view, previously adopted in
Swift v. Tyson that federal courts may declare rules of general common law in civil fields.")
(citation omitted) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 39.
43. Id. at 42-43.
44. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
45. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 42 n.8 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Mapp v. Ohi 46 presented the exclusionary rule as "part and parcel ' 47 of
the fourth amendment and an "essential ingredient" 4 of the rights it secures,
the Court in Bivens could have treated the damages remedy as of the same
constitutional status. Since Congress had not acted, there was no need to
discuss congressional power as relevant to the initial existence of judicial
power.
To some extent, Justice Brennan's opinion follows along the lines hypothesized above. He described the fourth amendment as "guarantee[ing]
to citizens of the United States the absolute right to be free from unrea49
sonable searches and seizures carried out by virtue of federal authority,
and emphasized the role of federal courts in remedying violations of federal
law.50 There was even an invocation of Marbury v. Madison's statement
that "[t]he very essence of civil liberty consists certainly in the right of
every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives
an injury."51 Were this analysis-as well as the rebuttal of the government's
52
position that the plaintiff's cause of action depended on state law -all it
contained, the opinion could be fairly characterized as constitutional in the
sense of flowing from the document's mandates, even though Justice Brennan suggests that the question of remedies for constitutional violations
stands on no different footing than the general issue of remedies for violation
53
of federal law.
However, the opinion does not stop there. Justice Brennan hypothesizes
two instances in which a damages action would not be available to a Bivens
plaintiff, neither of which was before the Court. I will deal first with the
second exception because it raises most directly and straightforwardly the
bearing of congressional action on judicial power. Brennan's second exception evokes the possibility of Congress taking away the green light which
the Court had given itself. The relevant quote is as follows:
[W]e cannot accept respondents' formulation of the question as whether
the availability of money damages is necessary to enforce the Fourth
Amendment. For we have here no explicit congressional declaration that
persons injured by a federal officer's violation of the Fourth Amendment
may not recover money damages but must instead be
remitted to another
5
remedy, equally effective in the view of Congress. 4

46. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
47. Id. at 651.

48. Id. at 656.
49. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 392.

50. Id. at 396.
51. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
52. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 394-96.
53. Id. at 397 ("The question is merely whether petitioner, if he can demonstrate an injury
consequent upon the violation by federal agents of his Fourth Amendment rights, is entitled
to redress his injury through a particular remedial mechanism normally available in the federal
courts.") (emphasis added).
54. Id.
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One way to read this is to treat the second sentence as referring to the
first through the word "for." Thus, if Congress had remitted the plaintiff
to some other remedy which it thought equally effective the question of
necessity would arise and the Court would proceed to decide that question
as part of its responsibility under the Constitution. However, the Court has
tended to ignore the first sentence and, instead, has focused on the reference
to Congress as indicating that it may be able to preclude Bivens actions."
For example, in Carlson the Court stated that there are two exceptions to
the general availability of a Bivens action, and that "[tihe second is when
defendants show that Congress has provided an alternative remedy which
it explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery directly under the
Constitution and viewed as equally effective." 56 As stated in Carlson, such
action defeats the Bivens remedy.5 7 Thus the second exception becomes a
kind of clear statement rule: Congress can preclude direct damages relief
for Bivens plaintiffs, at least through alternative remedies, but because to
do so runs counter to constitutional values, it must be absolutely clear that
it wishes that result.58 The Court's statements on the second exception vary,
and a case can be made that it has reserved the last word for itself.5 9 The
initial statement in Bivens is "somewhat cryptic" as Professor Dellinger
puts it, 60 but it does seem clearly to contemplate a system of shared powers
over the subject matter. Both branches may act.
Should inaction by Congress have any bearing on the judiciary's initial
power? It is at this point that the even more cryptic first exception must
be considered. It is stated as follows: "The present case involves no special
factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress." ' 6' Justice Brennan contrasts the matter before the Court in Bivens
with two previous decisions. The first was a case in which the Court refused

55. These analyses are sometimes ambiguous as to whether the Court retains some power
to review what Congress has provided. Thus in Davis the Court, in discussing possible reasons
not to entertain a Bivens action, noted the absence of an "explicit" congressional bar. 442
U.S. at 246-47. However, it later stated that "were Congress to create equally effective
alternative remedies, the need for damages relief might be obviated." Id. at 248. This suggests
the courts would look at effectiveness. The original Bivens reference to "another remedy,
equally effective in the view of Congress" suggests that the latter has the last word, at least
if the sentence is taken in isolation. 403 U.S. at 397.
56. 446 U.S. at 18-19 (emphasis by the Court).
57. Id. at 18. Here again the Court refers only to whether Congress viewed its remedy as
equally effective. See also Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 373 (1983) ("Congress has not expressly
precluded the creation of [a Bivens] remedy by declaring that existing statutes provide the
exclusive mode of redress.").
58. Note, Bivens Doctrine in Flux: Statutory Preclusion of a Constitutional Cause of
Action, 101 HAv. L. RPv. 1251, 1260-61 (1988) [hereinafter Harvard Note].
59. See Steinman, supra note 14, at 279-84 (arguing for judicial scrutiny).
60. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. Rv.
1532, 1548 n.89 (1972).
61. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396.

INDIANA LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:263

to allow the government to recover damages from a private party for injury
to a soldier. 62 That decision seemed to rest on Congress' power to create

such a liability and its expertise in matters of the federal fisc. 63 The second
case involved a refusal to imply a damages remedy from a nonconstitutional

64
source: statutes and Congress' rules governing actions by its employees.
Yet Bivens was a case in which the rights and duties were derived directly

from the Constitution. Perhaps these citations simply suggest that constitutional remedial issues are like other remedial issues in that the judicial
branch can exercise discretion in fashioning them. However, far more
significant is the quoted passage itself and the significance it attributes to

the absence of congressional action. The conclusion is inescapable that if
Congress had spoken, the Court's authority would be even clearer since

there would be no need to think about hesitation. In other words, Congress'
inaction should give the judiciary pause before embarking on Bivens remedies, at least to the extent of inquiring whether there are "special factors

counselling hesitation. ' 65 This reading rests on the assumption that the
"affirmative" action Justice Brennan had in mind was an authorization for
the courts to proceed.
In the most recent Bivens case6

Justice Brennan's attempt to rewrite

retroactively this sentence implies that the congressional action he had in
mind was the provision of alternative remedies, not an authorization for
the judiciary to proceed. Absent such action, any hesitation would be even
more clearly a matter of judicial discretion, rather than one of judicial
authority. However, as originally written, the sentence seems to say that
federal courts in Bivens cases are on weaker ground than in section 1983
cases because Congress plays a role in determining the extent of their

authority. This detracts significantly from the notion of Bivens as resting
on a view of the Constitution as self-executing.

62. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 311 (1947).
63. After discussing Standard Oil the Court made a "see" reference to United States v.
Gilman, 347 U.S. 507 (1954). The Court did not elaborate on this reference, although it did
in Bush. Gilman involved the government's right to indemnity from an employee after it was
found liable in an F.T.C.A. suit. The Bush Court described it as involving "questions of
employee discipline and morale, fiscal policy, and the efficiency of the federal service." Bush,
462 U.S. at 380.
64. Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963). The plaintiff also asserted a constitutional
claim, but this did not figure significantly in the Court's opinion.
65. 403 U.S. at 396.
66. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 108 S.Ct. 2460 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting). As rewritten
the sentence refers to "special factors counselling hesitation [even] in the case of affirmative
action by Congress." Id. at 2474 (emphasis added). This seems to suggest that the Court
should hesitate even if Congress had provided no alternative remedy and there is something
special about the case, and that the case for hesitation would be even stronger if it had
provided a remedy. For an analysis of the original sentence which parallels that offered here,
see Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 503 (1978).
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Justice Harlan's concurring opinion can perhaps be read as closer to a
constitutional one than Justice Brennan's. 67 As a general matter he emphasizes the judiciary's "particular responsibility to assure the vindication of
'68
constitutional interests such as those embraced by the Fourth Amendment.
While the Court may choose among remedial mechanisms, it is under a
"duty" to make this choice, guided by "whether compensatory relief is
'necessary' or 'appropriate' to the vindication of the interest asserted." ' 69 In
Bivens, Justice Harlan viewed damages as "the only possible remedy" for
someone in the plaintiff's position.7 0 As he put it in what is surely the most
quoted phrase in the entire case, "[flor people in Bivens shoes, it is damages
or nothing."'
On the other hand, Justice Harlan does not doubt that Congress has a
substantial role to play in the matter. He states the initial question to be
resolved as "whether the power to authorize damages as a judicial remedy
for the vindication of a federal constitutional right is placed by the Constitution itself exclusively in Congress' hands." 72 The crux of his opinion is
the emphasis on judicial discretion and choice in granting a remedy.73 He
depicts the Court as capable of taking into consideration a range of policy
considerations "at least as broad as . . .a legislature would consider with
respect to an express statutory authorization of a traditional remedy." 7 4
Does this mean only that in constitutional cases a court, once vested with
subject matter jurisdiction, 75 has a broad discretion over remedial issues
while it would not have any such discretion as to the underlying merits
issues of what the Constitution demands? Or does it mean that remedial
issues are so inherently legislative that decisions with respect to them are a
form of federal common law, declared in the absence of legislative resolution
and subject to legislative revision? After all, Justice Harlan cites a number
of federal common law cases, 76 and repeatedly relies on an analogy between
the issue in Bivens and the implication of private rights of action from
federal statutes.7 7 He describes 'this process as something more than just
statutory construction. 71 It involves the judiciary in furthering the policies

67. See Carlson, 446 U.S. at 31 n.2 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
68. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 407 (Harlan, J., concurring).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 409-10.
71. Id. at 410.
72. Id. at 401-02 (emphasis added).
73. E.g., id. at 408 n.8.
74. Id. at 407.
75. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982) grants the district courts jurisdiction over "all civil actions
arising under the Constitution ...of the United States."
76. E.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943), discussed infra text
accompanying notes 217-19.
77. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 402, 407 (citing J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964)).
78. Id. at 403 n.4.
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of a particular statute through remedial choices. The liberal approach to

implication which prevailed at the time Justice Harlan wrote is generally
79
viewed as a form of federal common law.
In sum, there is enough in both the majority and concurring opinions in
Bivens to indicate that it is less than a constitutional decision and that what
Congress might say about remedies in any given case will carry a good deal

of weight.
D.

Judicial Versus Legislative Competence in the Recent Decisions

The initial formulation of the special factors exception suggested that it
might be triggered by the subject matter of the case at hand 0 or by the

defendant's place within the government." The recent cases denying Bivens
actions have based special factors analysis on the subject matter coupled,
generally, with congressional action providing a partial remedy for the
action complained of. The availability of Bivens has become crucial because
it would provide more extensive relief than the alternative remedy. In
Chappell v. Wallace,8 2 for example, servicemen alleged adverse personnel
action based on their race. The Court held that "[tiaken together, the
unique disciplinary structure of the Military Establishment and Congress'
activity in the field constitute 'special factors' which dictate that it would
be inappropriate to provide enlisted military personnel a Bivens-type remedy

against their superior officers." 3 There are, indeed, strong suggestions in
the military cases" that the Constitution's conferral upon Congress of
plenary power over military affairs is enough, by itself, to constitute a
special factor which would keep the courts out.

5

In the contexts of Bivens

actions by federal employees8 6 and Social Security disability claimants,8

however, the Court seems to view congressional action as a prerequisite to

79. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 717-18 (1979) (Rehnquist,
J., concurring).
80. See Bush, 462 U.S. at 380 (cases cited in Bivens suggest that special factors involve
federal fiscal policy or federal employer-employee relationships).
81. See Carlson, 446 U.S. at 19; Davis, 442 U.S. at 246. In Stanley, Justice Brennan
argued that this should be the only meaning of the special factors exception. United States v.
Stanley, 107 S. Ct. 3054, 3068-77 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). However the notion of
special factors counselling hesitation is not so easily confined, as the recent cases demonstrate.
Indeed, in Bush, Justice Stevens indicated the concept goes beyond the normal inquiries that
are a component of a court's remedial discretion. 462 U.S. at 380.
82. 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
83. Id. at 304.
84. Chappell, 462 U.S. 296; Stanley, 107 S. Ct. 3054.
85. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 301; Stanley, 107 S. Ct. at 3063. Indeed, in Stanley, no remedy
was available.
86. Bush, 462 U.S. 367, and the remand in Cooper v. Kotarski, 108 S. Ct. 2861 (1988).
87. Chilicky, 108 S. Ct. 2460.
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special factors analysis. In turn this action provides the Court with a basis
for invoking Congress' superior competence in dealing with the subject,
triggering "hesitation" by the judiciary.
Thus an important theme of the Bivens dissents (institutional competence)
has become part of the Court's approach to Bivens actions through a
concept found in the original majority opinion (the special factors excep8
tion). In Bush v. Lucas"
the Court stated that "Congress is in a far better
position than a court to evaluate the impact of a new species of litigation
between federal employees on the efficiency of the civil service." 8 9 The
Court emphasized Congress' familiarity with the subject and its ability to
utilize superior fact-finding procedures such as hearings. 90 The Court has
intimated that the military Bivens cases also rest in part on Congress'
superior institutional competence. 9'
Institutional competence cannot logically be confined to any particular
area, however. The Court seems to have opened the door to this argument
and its implications in Schweiker v. Chilicky,92 the most recent refusal to
allow a Bivens action. The plaintiffs claimed constitutional violations in the
denial of Social Security disability benefits. The Court noted the vastness
of the Social Security program and cited Bush for the proposition that
Congress is more competent in fashioning remedies for constitutional violations in its administration. 9 However, the Court took Bush a major step
further. There the opinion had referred to Congress' competence at "balancing governmental efficiency and the rights of employees." '94 In Chilicky,
the quote was altered by substituting "individuals" for "employees. " 95 The
reference to superior competence can now cover all Bivens actions since a
crucial question in any Bivens suit is whether vindication of the individual
plaintiff's right should prevail over the needs of the program, whatever the
program may be. It would, for that matter, require only a bit of extrapolation to conclude that competence by itself, whether exercised or not, is a
reason for the courts to stay out. Short of that, perhaps, repeated invocation
of Congress' superior competence suggests acceptance of another argument
in the Bivens dissents: that devising remedies for violation of federal rights
is an essentially legislative task.

88. 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
89. Bush, 462 U.S. at 389.

90. Id.
91. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304. "[I]t is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental
activity in which the courts have less competence." Id. at 302 (quoting Gilligan v. Morgan,
413 U.S. 1, 4 (1973)).
92. 108 S. Ct. 2460 (1988).

93. Id. at 2467-68.
94. Bush, 462 U.S. at 389.
95. 108 S. Ct. at 2469.
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The Court's View of Bivens Remedies as an Essentially
Legislative Matter

Except possibly in the military context, the recent denials of Bivens
remedies have not rested on any notion that the judiciary is without initial
authority to grant them. Indeed, in Bush, Justice Stevens's opinion explicitly
affirmed the major premise of Bivens: "The federal courts' statutory
jurisdiction to decide federal questions confers adequate power to award
damages to the victim of a constitutional violation.' '96 Yet the Court has
refused to exercise that power because of Congress' action in providing
some form of remedy. It might be that the Court has examined carefully
what Congress has done, measured it against a constitutional standard of
adequacy, and concluded that what exists is more or less as good as what
the judiciary could come up with. There are traces of such an approach in
the recent cases, but little more. 97 The fact that Congress has acted is far
more important than what it has done.
In part, the Court seems to view the subject matter of the cases before
it as essentially legislative in nature. Everything depends on how one defines
the subject matter. Is it remedying constitutional violations, or is it prescribing the remedies available as part of a particular governmental program?
The latter formulation places control with Congress since only it can
establish federal programs. Bush epitomizes this approach. A federal civil
service employee alleged demotion for "whistle-blowing," a constitutional
claim. According to Justice Stevens, however, "the ultimate question on
the merits in this case may appropriately be characterized as one of 'federal
personnel policy.' ' 98 Perforce, that makes it a legislative matter. Analytically, however, the subject matter should make no difference because any
Bivens claim can only arise out of a program created by Congress." Thus
the Bivens dissenters, who denied judicial power altogether, would prevail
in a less categorical fashion. Because the matter is essentially legislative (and
because of Congress' superior expertise) any action by Congress would
displace any judicial power that might otherwise exist. Justice O'Connor's
opinion for the Court in Chilicky can be read this way. Having first
suggested a contextual, or subject matter, approach'00 she then rejected it
on the general ground that "Congress is in a better position to decide

96. 462 U.S. at 378.
97. E.g., Chilicky, 108 S.Ct. at 2468 (remedies provided by Congress "meaningful");
Bush, 462 U.S. at 378 n.14 (existing civil service remedies "clearly constitutionally adequate.").
98. Bush, 462 U.S. at 380-81.
99. See Stanley, 107 S. Ct. at 3077 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
100. Chiicky, 108 S. Ct. at 2467.

19891

CIVIL RIGHTS

whether or not the public interest would be served by creating [a damages
liability]. ''101

Might the Court be saying that because Bivens remedies are essentially a
legislative matter, Congress' remedial schemes should be interpreted as a
directive to the judiciary to stay out? Justice Black's Bivens dissent was
willing to draw such an inference from the existence of section 1983.102 The
Court, on the other hand, seemed to require that Congress state expressly
any displacement of the judiciary. That is the second exception. To read
such a directive into a remedial scheme merges the second exception-with
its clear statement requirement-into the broader notion of "special factors
counsellirig hesitation."' 01 3
The task would then become discerning the intent of Congress. Chilicky
suggests that this is precisely what courts are to do. Congress' failure to
provide a judicial remedy may not have been "inadvertent." 104 Indeed, "the
design of a government program [may] suggest that Congress has provided
what it considers adequate remedial mechanisms for constitutional violations
that may occur in the course of its administration."' 0 5 These suggestions
sound more like directives. According to the Court, Congress chooses
"specific forms and levels of protection"' 1 6 for the rights of persons in
government programs. This choice can be viewed either as a directive to
the judiciary or as a form of preemption of the field.' °7 To add a Bivens
remedy would upset this choice.
Whether one focuses on the legislatively created remedies as part of an
article I program or as a directive to the judiciary, the net effect is to view
legislative power as superior to judicial power. This is not quite the position
of the dissenters who viewed the remedial issue as solely legislative. However,
101. Id. at 2469 (quoting Bush, 462 U.S. at 390) (rejecting contextually limited reading of
Bush). As noted, she had earlier broadened Bush to a case concerned with "balancing
governmental efficiency and the rights of [individuals]." Id. (quoting Bush, 462 U.S. at 389).
Justice Stevens recently equated the problem posed in constitutional and nonconstitutional
cases in the following terms: "When [a] novel question of policy involves a balancing of the
conflicting interests in the efficient operation of a massive governmental program and the
protection of the rights of the individual-whether in the social welfare context, the civil
service context or the military procurement context-I feel very deeply that we should defer
to the expertise of the Congress." Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2510, 2528
(1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
102. 403 U.S. at 429 (Black, J., dissenting).
103. Steinman, supra note 14, at 290; Georgia Note, supra note 14, at 714 n.130; Harvard
Note, supra note 58, at 1255.
104. 108 S. Ct. at 2468.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 2469.
107. In its brief in Chilicky the government argued that "Congress has completely occupied
the field of social security disability benefits with a carefully drawn comprehensive set of
procedures that provide meaningful remedies for any constitutional violations that might occur
in the processing of claims for benefits." Brief for Petitioners at 38, Chilicky, 108 S. Ct. 2460
(capitalization altered).
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the Court has perhaps come close to embracing the dissenters' position,
twice referring to Bivens remedies as "a new substantive legal liability.' ' 08
In any event, the Court has clearly installed Congress as the dominant
branch in Bivens matters. This position is in harmony with the dissenters'
view. And it is only a short step to concluding that a program with extremely
limited remedies, or perhaps no remedies at all, represents a congressional
choice as to "specific forms and levels of protection." In the next two
sections I address the basic premises of this remarkable doctrinal development: the view of Congress' institutional competence as superior and the
view of damage remedies as essentially a legislative matter.
II.

Tim COMPARISON BETWEEN JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE
COMPETENCE AND ITS BEARING ON BIV'ENS REMEDIES

A.

The Comparison in General

The issue of judicial versus legislative competence, which plays such a
significant role in the recent Bivens cases, is central to the broader BurgerRehnquist Court theme of de-emphasizing federal judicial lawmaking.' °9 The
Court mixes concern for who ought, in the constitutional scheme, to make
law with concern for who can best do it. At times the focus is on Congress'
political accountability as legitimizing its role in making broad societal
decisions."10 At times the focus is on the fact that federal courts are not
general common law courts as their state counterparts are."' Thus, they
possess at best, a limited and specialized lawmaking competence. Neither
of these sub-themes plays a dominant role in the recent Bivens cases,
although both are present. However, the presence of the Constitution as a
central part of any Bivens question goes far to rebut them. In applying the
Constitution the federal courts acquire a legitimacy of their own which is
separate from that bestowed by the electoral process. In this area, moreover,
they exercise a substantial amount of lawmaking authority regardless of the
extent to which one views it as governed by the original instrument and its
framers' intent.

108. Chilicky, 108 S. Ct. at 2469 (quoting Bush, 462 U.S. at 390) (quoting Standard Oil
Co., 332 U.S. at 302).
109. See Brown, Article III as a Fundamental Value-The Demise of Northern Pipeline and
its Implications for Congressional Power, 49 OHIo ST. L.J. 55, 80-81 (1988). In the Bivens
context, however, cutting back on or even eliminating the damages action will not reduce
significantly the judicial branch's ability to make new law in the sense of giving meaning to
constitutional provisions. Most of the same merits issues will continue to arise in § 1983 cases.
110. E.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188-91 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
111. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 717-18 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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In the Bivens context the Court has focused on a third sub-theme:
Congress is better able to find the facts and make the resultant policies
about remedies. There is a common sense element to the notion that courts
and legislatures engage in different forms of fact-finding, and that each is
better in its own domain. Professor Davis defines the familiar distinction
between legislative and adjudicative facts as follows:
When a court or an agency finds facts concerning the immediate partieswho did what, where, when, how, and with what motive or intent-the
court or agency is performing an adjudicative function, and the facts
are conveniently called adjudicative facts .... Legislative facts are the
facts which help the tribunal determine the content of law and of policy
and help the tribunal to exercise its judgment or discretion in determining
what course of action to take. Legislative 2facts are ordinarily general
and do not concern the immediate parties.1

The prototypical fact-finding method for courts is the trial-with its
adversarial nature and focus on the facts of a particular case. For legislatures, it is the more wide-ranging hearing, perhaps a series of hearings held
across the nation. It is easy to assume that Congress is the superior factfinder because of the broader range of techniques available to it, the fact
that it can deal with a problem without waiting for a case to present it,
and because it can exercise continuing oversight of that problem."' Yet it
is important, as Professor Monaghan states, "not to overstate the supposed
superiority of legislative factfinding.1" 4 Courts can utilize expert testimony."' They have the advantage of seeing how legal norms work in a
concrete factual setting." 6 And a frequently recurring problem-such as
when to allow Bivens actions-allows them to also exercise a form of
oversight.
Appellate courts, in particular, rely heavily on legislative facts to, in
Professor Davis' words, "determine what course of action to take. ' " 7 In
Brown v. Board of Education,"8 for example, the Court relied extensively
on sociological evaluations of the importance of education in American
society. More recently, in cutting back on the exclusionary rule, the Court
has taken an overtly empirical approach, drawing broad conclusions from
statistical data as well as from general assumptions about how the criminal
justice system works." 9 The line between legislative facts and the policies
112. K. DAvis, ADmrssamAnvE LAW TExT § 15.03, at 296 (3d ed. 1972).
113. See Field, supra note 15, at 993 (outlining arguments for legislative competence).
114. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1, 28 n.147
(1975). In general, however, he accepts the superior competence of legislatures in many aspects
of fact-finding.
115. Id.
116. Field, supranote 15, at 934. Professor Field is a strong proponent of judicial lawmaking.
See infra text accompanying notes 238-61.
117. K. DAvis, supra note 112.
118. 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954).
119. E.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907-08 n.6, 916-17 (1984).
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they generate is itself a blurred one. In a classic common law appellate
opinion the two are closely intermingled. The point is that courts act as
though they possess a substantial degree of competence to find and utilize
legislative facts, that this premise seems justified, and that this action is an
accepted part of our legal system. An excellent illustration at the federal
level, and one directly relevant to decisions concerning the availability of
Bivens remedies, is the development of immunity defenses for public officials.
B.

Judicial Competence in Action-The Immunity Defense

Federal, state and local officials sued in damages for violations of federal
constitutional rights may assert immunity defenses. In some cases absolute
immunity from damages is available. Judges, legislators and prosecutors
may claim it, at least when acting within their core functions. 120 For most
officials, however, the available defense is one of qualified immunity. These
officials cannot be sued for damages "as long as their actions could
reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to
have violated.''
The availability of the defense "generally turns on the
'objective legal reasonableness' of the action . .. assessed in light of the
'
legal rules that were 'clearly established' at the time it was taken."'
The existence of these defenses and the elaborate network of rules
governing their assertion are entirely a matter of judge-made rather than
statutory law. This extensive development in constitutional cases first took
place in the context of section 1983 suits. That statute grants a right to sue
without mentioning immunity or any other defense. Nonetheless, the Court
has reasoned that the Reconstruction Congress which enacted it would not
have wished to abolish well recognized immunities existing at common
law. 23 Thus, a defendant who would have had such a defense in the
nineteenth century can assert it today as long as that assertion is not
inconsistent with the purposes of section 1983.24 Moreover, the availability
of immunity in section 1983 suits is not historically frozen. If the official's
position is analogous to one which would have benefitted from immunity
he can assert it successfully. 25 Realistically, what is involved is the incorporation of the common law methodology of immunity determination into

120. See Forrester v. White, 108 S. Ct. 538 (1988).
121. Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 3038 (1987).
122. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982)).
123. E.g., City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. 247, 258 (1981).
124. E.g., Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920 (1984).
125. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508-16 (1978) (analogizing role of hearing officers
to that of judges).
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section 1983 litigation,12 6 despite the Court's frequent assertions that the
matter is one of statutory construction. 127 As developed below, this is a
'
broad ranging inquiry guided primarily by concerns of "public policy."'
It could certainly be argued that immunity defenses in Bivens actions
against federal officials present different issues than do the defenses in
section 1983 actions against state and local officials. 29 However, in Butz v.
Economou,30 the Court specificially rejected this argument, asserting that
the analysis in the two inquiries is the same. It would be "untenable to
draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought
against state officials under section 1983 and suits brought dir&ctly under
the Constitution against federal officials."''
The Court reasoned that the
Constitution bears equally on both sets of officials and that the functional
purposes of any immunity doctrine are equally applicable. After Butz, the
Court's practice in all immunity cases has been to draw on both section
32
1983 and Bivens precedents to resolve the particular problem at hand.
And the analysis makes clear that what is at work in these cases is a process
of common law reasoning and development of the law, guided as much by
policy as by precedent.
What does the Court do when presented with a possible immunity defense?
Based in part on factual assumptions, it balances.' 33 On the one hand are
the specific concerns of the plaintiff-the need for damages ,as possibly
"the only realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional guarantees"14_
and the general societal interest in deterring constitutional violations 35 as
well as the legal system's basic assumption that "[n]o man in this country
is so high that he is above the law."' 36 On the other side of the scale are
what the Court has described as
two mutually dependent rationales:
(1) the injustice, particularly in the absence of bad faith, of subjecting
to liability an officer who is required, by the legal obligations of his
position, to exercise discretion; (2) the danger that the threat of such
liability would deter his willingness to execute his office 7with the decisiveness and the judgment required by the public good. 13

126. See Brown, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983 and the Ambiguities of Burger
Court Federalism: A Comment on City of Oklahoma v. Tuttle and Penbaur v. City of
Cincinnati-The "Official Policy" Cases, 27 B.C.L. Rsv. 883, 887 (1986).
127. E.g, Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 635 (1980).
128. See Butz, 438 U.S. at 506.
129. Id. at 524-26 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
130. 438 U.S. 478.

131. Id. at 504.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

E.g., Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986).
E.g., Harlow, 457 U.S. at 813.
Id. at 814.
Butz, 438 U.S. at 505.
Id. at 506 (quoting United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882)).
Id. at 497 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974)).
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The Court has identified other issues which relate to broader considerations of effectiveness in the public service including the expense of litigation,
the divergence of official energy from more directly important issues and
the possible deterrence of citizens from entering government service.' 38 There
is surely a substantial degree of generalized fact-finding involved in addressing these issues as well.
The basic reconciliation of these competing interests has been to afford
qualified immunity to officials performing discretionary functions. 3 9 However, in developing what it has characterized as its "functional" approach
to immunity law,' 40 the Court has accorded absolute immunity to judges
and legislators.' 4' The need for judicial creativity and the extent to which
notions of public policy underlie the enterprise are particularly apparent in
the Court's "functional" treatment of officials who look judicial but are
not judges. The Court has accorded absolute immunity to prosecutors,
federal hearing examiners and administrative law judges, witnesses in judicial
proceedings, and grand jurors. 42 In doing so the Court has invoked the
common law traditions of particular immunities, 43 particularly in section
44
1983 cases where there is a perceived need to utilize historical justifications.
More important, however, is the common law process of reasoning by
analogy in order to achieve a desirable result. Thus, in Cleavinger v.
Saxner,4 - the Court's split over whether to accord absolute immunity to
members of a prison discipline committee stemmed in part from differing
assessments as to how much the committee's functions resembled the judicial
process 46 and in part from differing assessments as to the effect of immunity
"[i]nside the prison walls."' 147
Considerations of institutional competence have not impeded the creation
of an extensive body of judge-made law, without statutory authorizationalmost counter the statute in section 1983 cases-based on notions of public
policy and capable of reflecting finely tuned distinctions. 48 Plaintiffs win
their share of victories, as well as defendants. The question then arises
whether, and why, judicial competence should vanish when allowing a
Bivens action is at issue. 49
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814.
Id. at 807.
Id. at 810-11.
See, e.g., Forrester, 108 S. Ct. 538.
E.g., Butz, 438 U.S. 478.

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Forrester, 108 S. Ct. at 543.
See Brown, supra note 126.
474 U.S. 193 (1985).
Compare id. at 203-04 with id. at 208-12 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 209 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

148. Compare Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983) with Malley, 475 U.S. 335.

149. For an analogous example of judicial competence in action, see Boyle v. United
Technologies Corp., 108 S.Ct. 2510 (1988) (formulating broad doctrine of immunity for
defense contractors). The dissent argued that the Court "lacks both authority and expertise
to fashion such a rule." Id. at 2520 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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C. Judicial Competence and Bivens Remedies
The kinds of things that go into consideration of whether to allow a
Bivens action-putting aside temporarily the question whether that is a new
"cause of action" or awarding relief for an existing one' 50-seem essentially
the same as those that go into consideration of whether to allow the
immunity defense. The general issue is one of "balancing governmental
efficiency with the rights of [individuals]," to use Justice O'Connor's phrase
in Chilicky.'5 1 Here the focus is more on the plaintiff and the appropriate
response of the legal system to his complaint of a constitutional wrong. If
anything, that makes the case for judicial competence stronger. The law of
remedies has developed over centuries "to make good the wrong done.' '3 2
Justice Harlan, concurring in Bivens cited this as a classic example of
judicial competence.Y3 He made the bridge between private remedies and
the Bivens problem in the following terms:
the experience of judges in dealing with private trespass and false
imprisonment claims supports the conclusion that courts of law are

capable of making the types of judgment concerning causation and

magnitude of injury necessary to accord
54 meaningful compensation for

invasion of Fourth Amendment rights.

Indeed, one could cite the judiciary's role in enforcement of the Constitution 55
as an additional kind of expertise in itself. 5 6
Of course the current Court does not proceed from an explicit denial of
any judicial competence. Rather, like the Bivens dissenters, it focuses on
Congress' superior competence. This then becomes a special factor counselling hesitation, at least where Congress has acted. The contextual approach plays an important role here. Thus a particular subject matter-the
Civil Service system in Bush, the Social Security system in Chilicky-is
depicted as presenting complex institutional problems. Congress is depicted
as not only better at addressing those problems, through hearings, for
example, but as having developed an expertise through dealing with them.
The courts do not possess a similar expertise. One could quarrel with the

150. See infra text accompanying notes 162-68.
151. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 108 S. Ct. 2460, 2469 (1988) (O'Connor, J.) (quoting Bush v.
Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 389 (1983)).
152. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
408 n.8 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
153. Id.at 409.
154. Id.
155. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241-42 (1979). See Dellinger, supra note 60, at 1564.
156. In Chilicky Justice Brennan noted that "courts do not lack familiarity or expertise in
determining what the dictates of the Due Process Clause are." 108 S. Ct. at 2478 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
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conclusion-citing the vast body of welfare and social security cases, ' 57 for
example-but it is the premise which is potentially more destructive of
Bivens. Congress possesses the same expertise, even if latent, with respect
to any program established under any of its powers. This expertise becomes
a wall against the judiciary as long as there is legislation with respect to
some form of remedies for violations of some rights within the program.
If expertise is the trump card the remedies need not extend to constitutional
violations. Even a decision to afford no remedies at all may be seen as a
result of bringing expertise to bear on the matter.
Justice Brennan, who seems to be fighting a rearguard action to preserve
Bivens, is willing to accept a limited contextual approach. 58 Yet at the same
time he sees the potential fallacy in the notion that "congressional authority
over a given subject is itself a 'special factor' that 'counsel[s] hesitation
[even] in the absence of affirmative action by Congress." ' 5 9 He is particularly concerned with its spread to "areas in which congressional competence
is no greater than that of the courts."'' 6
One need not state the matter this strongly. Even if Congress' competence
in remedial matters is, generally speaking, superior to the courts', that does
not mean that they possess no competence. As long as there is concurrent
competence, why not allow concurrent sets of remedies? This would respect
the functions and capabilities of each branch. Perhaps superior competence
supports the argument that Congress should be able to preclude the judiciary
if it really wants to.1 6' Short of such an intention, however, the judiciary's
own competence justifies its remaining in the field.
Another problem with a subject matter focus is that it deflects attention
from the presence as a constant of both a constitutional claim and a request
that the judiciary vindicate it through a damages award. Vindication of
constitutional claims is an important part of the judiciary's role. Stating
the matter in terms of context focuses on the legislature's role in creating
the program which produced that context. Relative competence apart, it is
a way of concluding that legislative action should oust judicial action because
the matter is essentially legislative. I believe that the Court has gone a long
way beyond questions of competence toward embracing this position. As
noted, any Bivens action involves "balancing governmental efficiency and
the rights of individuals." Thus one must ultimately confront the Bivens
dissenters' contention (reinforced by Chief Justice Rehnquist) that this is

157. E.g., Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970) (reviewing state compliance with federal
welfare requirements). In Rosado the Court noted the "escalating involvement of federal courts
in [the] highly complicated area of welfare benefits." Id. at 422.
158. See Chiicky, 108 S. Ct. at 2477-78.
159. Id. at 2478 (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396).
160. Id.
161. See infra text accompanying notes 187-91, discussing a clear statement approach as a
prerequisite to such preclusion.
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something which only Congress can do. This is particularly so because, as
the recent cases illustrate, the presence of any congressionally created
remedial scheme allows the Court to have it both ways: asserting that Bivens
is good law while continuing to deny Bivens actions.
III.

BIVENs ACTIONS AS AN ESSENTIALLY LEGISLATIVE MATTER

Is Bivens a form of lawmaking? The original dissenters said yes, primarily

based on the notion that it involved the creation of a wholly new "cause
1 63
of action." 1 62 Since similar language has cropped up in the recent opinions,
and since it goes so directly to the issue of judicial power, I wish to discuss
it before turning to the current Court's emphasis on congressional remedies.
Just what the phrase "cause of action" means is a perennially perplexing
problem. 64 The Court has said that it might "mean one thing for one
purpose and something different for another." 165 The drafters of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure abandoned it in favor of the supposedly clearer
notion of a "claim for which relief can be granted."' Whether this is
anything more than old wine in new bottles can be questioned. In any event
the phrase "cause of action" continues to play an important role in Supreme
Court cases, particularly those involving private parties' rights to sue under
federal statutes. 67 A possible working definition is that a plaintiff alleges a
cause of action if he asserts a set of facts showing a violation of a legal
right and/or a correlative legal duty, for which violation the law affords
is that the potential availability of relief
some relief. The important point
68
is part of the cause of action
How does Bivens fare under this definition? Certainly the Court did not
create the rights or the duties. They flow from the fourth amendment. It
is true that the Constitution does not provide for enforcement by damages
remedies, but it does not generally provide for any judicial enforcement at

162. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
427 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting).
163. E.g., Bush v. Lucas 462 U.S. 367, 390 (1983). See also Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S.
14, 53 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
164. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 237-38, 239 n.18 (1979).
165. United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1933), quoted in United
Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
166. FED. R. Crv. P. 12(b)(6). See FED. R. CIv. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring as part of a pleading
which sets forth a claim "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief").

167. E.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 690 n.13, 693-94, 696 n.21, 709,
717 (1979).
168. The statement of the necessary elements of a "claim" under rule 8(a)(2) bears this out.

For a similar definition see Cannon, 441 U.S. at 730 n.1 (Powell, J., dissenting). See also
Thompson v. Thompson 108 S. Ct. 513 (1988) ("rule of decision" narrower than "cause of

action").
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all. Yet the very notion of judicial review obviously assumes judicial

enforcement as does article III's conferral upon the federal courts of cases
"arising under this Constitution."'169 Congress might, of course, not confer

this jurisdiction on the federal courts, but it has done

SO,'

70

thus removing

any doubts on the jurisdictional score. Does it not then make the most
sense to treat the fourth amendment, against the general backdrop of

assumptions about judicial enforceability of the Constitution, as creating
the entire cause of action, including the authorization to award appropriate

relief at least among traditionally available judicial remedies? There is room
for judicial discretion and even judicial creativity, as the "constitutional
common law" thesis discussed below suggests.' 7' Congress can also act with
respect to these remedies. No initial congressional action is necessary beyond
conferring jurisdiction, however. 72 This does not involve the federal courts
in judicial lawmaking since the law-here the cause of action-comes from
a legitimate legislative source: the Constitution. If choosing among remedies

is not, in this context, a legislative act, the distinction between law and
equity upon which Justice Rehnquist relied in Carlson loses its force. 7
These points are made here to emphasize both the legitimacy of Bivens

actions and the fact that they fit squarely within generally accepted understandings of the legal system.

74

Damages actions play an important role in

controlling executive branch violations of the Constitution, constituting a
counterpart to equitable actions as a control on legislative violations. Thus
the present Court would find it hard to question Bivens itself. The recent
cases do not do so. They accept judicial power. The key element-the

special factor counselling hesitation in the exercise of that power-is the
presence of legislative power and legislative provision of some remedies for
some aspects of the wrongs complained of. The focus shifts to the presence
of these remedies as somehow foreclosing judicial action. As noted above,
169. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2.
170. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
171. See infra text accompanying notes 220-37. See also Note, The Scope of Bush v. Lucas:

An Examination of CongressionalRemedies for Whistleblowers, 88 CoLuM. L. REv. 587, 602
(1988) (Bivens remedy "a combination of constitutional interpretation and federal common
law").

172. In Bivens, both the majority opinion and Justice Harlan's concurrence relied substantially on the presence of jurisdiction. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396 (Brennan, J.); id. at 408 n.8
(Harlan, J., concurring). See also Bush, 462 U.S. at 374 (authority to choose among remedies
flows from the statutory grant of jurisdiction).
173. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 404-05 (Harlan, J., concurring). See Dellinger, supra note 60, at
1541-43. Under this view the authority to award remedies does not flow from the statutory

grant of jurisdiction, although that is a precondition to its exercise. The general authority
might be viewed as inherent in the "judicial power," whenever a litigant with a cause of
action comes before a court with jurisdiction over the subject matter. Authority in a specific
case might depend upon what the body creating the cause of action had provided. Id.
174. See Fallon, Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARv.
L. Rsv. 915, 955 (1988).
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the Court treats the matter as an article I problem: how to remedy violations
of federal rights which occur in the course of administration of a federal
program. The Court does not just defer to the body which created the
programs, although this helps decide the question of "who should decide
whether [such] a remedy should be provided.' ' 7 It treats the Bivens remedy
almost foreign to the whole matter which would be engrafted
as something
76
upon it.'
To state the matter this way is essentially to resolve it against the Bivens
plaintiff. It transmutes a problem with constitutional dimensions into a
legislative one. Those who argue for a reading of Bivens as constitutionally
required would of course reject it. For example, Professor Dellinger describes
that case as "resting on the premise that constitutional rights have a selfexecuting force that not only permits but requires the courts to recognize
remedies appropriate for their violation.'" 77 Others reach the same constitutional. position through emphasis on the need of individual plaintiffs for
effective vindication of their constitutional rights.17 I believe that one can
stop short of the constitutional position-i.e. that appropriate remedies are
required as opposed to merely authorized-and still criticize the recent
decisions on the ground that they downgrade the judiciary's particular
competence in vindicating constitutional rights and that they dismiss the
possibility of concurrent enforcement schemes. Concurrent enforcement
makes initial sense in that Congress did not create the Bivens "cause of
action." One could accept this position and still defer substantially to
Congress, even giving it the power to make its remedies exclusive.
Section 1983 provides a useful starting point for considering this position.
Bivens and section 1983 perform functionally similar roles at the federal
and the state and local levels.' 79 As a general proposition it would seem
that they ought to be available in similar circumstances. The identical
treatment of the two in the immunity context reflects, I believe, this
perception. Why not carry it forward to the Bivens inquiry as to the
availability of a damages remedy at the outset of a case?
If one accepts this general position, a specific tenet of section 1983
doctrine becomes particularly relevant: that this remedy is supplemental to
any set of remedies the state may provide, and available in a federal court
no matter what the state does. The principle was laid down in Monroe v.

175. Bush, 462 U.S. at 380.
176. Cf. id. at 389 (declining to create "a new species of litigation between federal employees
....

I').

177. Dellinger, supra note 60, at 1557.
178. Schrock & Welsh, Reconsidering the ConstitutionalCommon Law, 91 HAgv. L. REv.
1117, 1135-38 (1978).
179. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 21 n.6. See Eisenberg, Section 1983: DoctrinalFoundationsand
an Empirical Study, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 482, 486 (1982).
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Pape 10 and reaffirmed in Patsy v. Board of Regents.' Recent cases have
dented it, but only slightly. Under the doctrine of Parrattv. Taylor,81 2 for
example, state procedures can operate to preclude a section 1983 action for
deprivation of property without due process of law. However, that is because
the available procedures for redress constitute a due process remedy for the
deprivation which wipes out the underlying substantive claim. In the context
of constitutional challenges to state taxes, it may be that the state's judicial
procedures can foreclose recourse to section 1983.183 The general obligation
of state courts to entertain section 1983 appears to remain in force,'8 as
does the principle that that remedy is supplemental.
Given the functional equivalence of Bivens and section 1983, should the
doctrine of supplemental remedies be transferred to the former context like
the immunity defenses? After all, the premise of that transfer is that all
public officials should stand on the same footing when it comes to federal
judicial redress of their constitutional wrongs. It makes no difference to
the plaintiff who violated his rights. And a fundamental premise of the
legal system as a whole is the availability of judicial remedies for constitutional violations.
The argument for symmetry is tempting, but it cannot be pushed too far.
In the context of section 1983 the alternate remedies come from a state,
not a co-equal branch of the federal government. Section 1983, flowing
directly from the fourteenth amendment itself, reflects a distrust of state
processes and a decision to place the federal courts in a somewhat super85
visory role over state and local actions.1
Although the argument for a symmetrical application of the supplemental
remedy doctrine sheds some light on the issue of concurrent enforcement,
it ultimately fails for reasons of separation of powers. This is not because
section 1983 comes from Congress and Bivens comes from some lesser
authority. Rather it is a recognition of the need to defer to the power of
Congress over federal programs and perhaps even its power over the practice
and procedure of federal courts including the remedies available in those
courts. 8 6 The dilemma which the Court has not adequately resolved is how
to reconcile this need with the important goal of retaining an important

180. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
181. 457 U.S. 496 (1982). See Felder v. Casey, 108 S. Ct. 2302 (1988).
182. 451 U.S. 527 (1981). See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
183. See, e.g., Spencer v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 281 S.C. 492, 316 S.E.2d 386
(1984), aff'd, 471 U.S. 82 (1985) (per curiam); Note, Section 1983 in State Courts: A Remedy
for Unconstitutional State Taxation, 95 YALE L.J. 414 (1985).
184. Id. at 421-23.
185. See generally Developments in the Law, Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HAv. L.
Rv.1133 (1977).
186. See Dellinger, supra note 60, at 1546-47.
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first line role for Bivens actions. Co-equality is a two way street, and the
Bivens cause of action does not come from Congress.
It is important to recognize that there are alternatives to the approach
found in the recent cases. One approach would be to build on the second
Bivens exception: the notion that Congress can foreclose Bivens actions
through an express declaration. 187 The other side of this coin is a requirement
that Congress do so expressly, perhaps even through the use of some "magic
words" which make it crystal clear that the normally available Bivens action
is being displaced. 8" In particular, this is not any utilization of the silence
of Congress approach;8 9 nor does it involve drawing negative inferences
from what Congress did address. As noted, the second exception can be
seen as a classic example of the clear statement approach: Because displacing
the Bivens action has constitutional ramifications, Congress must state
expressly that it intends to do so. Does Congress have the power to do
so?' 9° The Court's cryptic treatments of the matter are ambiguous, but
suggest that it does.' 9' If so, Bivens can be seen as of less than purely
constitutional stature, a form of "constitutional common law," so to
speak. 92 Those who view Bivens as a constitutional decision would require
some degree of judicial review of the remedies which the legislature has
declared to be a substitute. 93 Either way, the clear statement approach has
94
two distinct advantages. First, inertia is on the side of the Bivens action.
It remains available to plaintiffs until Congress takes the considerable step
of declaring otherwise. Second, it strikes a balance between judicial and
legislative power. Neither is automatically superior. If, however, Bivens
actions would really wreak havoc with a congressional program, Congress
can do something about it.
Another approach would be for courts to exercise a high degree of
deference to any congressional remedial mechanism, tilting the presumption
away from the availability of Bivens remedies. This sounds like the current

187. This approach has been rejected by most commentators. See, e.g., Steinman, supra,
note 14, at 282-84. It does, however, strike a balance which preserves judicial power to a
much greater extent than in recent cases.
188. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 31 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
189. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 108 S. Ct. 2460, 2476-77 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
190. There is an analogy here to Congress' oft-discussed power to cut off the federal court's
jurisdiction over certain claims. See Hill, ConstitutionalRemedies, 69 CoLum. L. Rv. 1109,
1117-18 (1969).
191. See supra notes 56-60. Most recently, the Court in Chilicky indicated that an "explicit
statutory prohibition against the relief sought [or an] exclusive statutory alternative remedy"
would preclude a Bivens action. 108 S. Ct. at 2467. It decided the case, however, on special
factors grounds. Id. at 2468-71.
192. See infra text accompanying notes 220-37.
193. E.g., Steinman, supra note 14, at 282-84; Dellinger, supra note 60, at 1549; Hill, supra
note 190, at 1157.
194. The metaphor is borrowed from Professor Monaghan. Monaghan, supra note 114, at
29.
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Court's approach, but it is not. Rather, the Court would choose the
congressional scheme through the exercise of its own discretion, adopting
the legislative solution as its own, so to speak. It would not act out of a
reflex reaction that since there is some legislation on point its discretion
has necessarily been extinguished. Furthermore, for the exercise of discretion
to be meaningful the Court would have to engage in some weighing and
evaluation of what remedy Congress did give the plaintiff. The Court did
do this to some extent in Bush,195 but in Chilicky it seems to have moved
toward the position that congressional action ends the matter. 96 It may be
that the deferential approach discussed here is limited by the notion that
whatever Congress gives the plaintiff must be constitutionally adequate.'1
If it is not constitutionally adequate, or perhaps even if the Court does not
think it is enough, concurrent enforcement through the (supplementary)
Bivens remedy remains in effect. The point is that this second approach
keeps the notion of "special factors counselling hesitation" in the realm of
judicial discretion rather than the realm of judicial power.
The current Court has taken neither of these approaches. The clear
statement approach (the second Bivens exception) is neither invoked nor
examined, even when it might be.' 98 The Court does talk about the "elaborate and comprehensive"'' 99 nature of the remedies which Congress has
provided, but the point seems to be to bolster the conclusion that the whole
matter is really one for Congress anyway. The Court is coming increasingly
close to abandoning the field altogether, at least when Congress has provided
something. Congress is seen as the body which should act, and its remedies
represent its conclusion as to how the balance should be struck. 200 Apparently
that balance is binding and preempts the field. As one circuit judge put it,
"[t]he Supreme Court has decided that Congress is in the best position to
make this decision and that, when it has done so, the courts should not
interfere with the balance Congress has struck.' '201 This is essentially the
approach the current Court uses when deciding whether to imply a private
right of action from a federal statute. 2 2 That issue is a question of statutory

195. 426 U.S. at 385-88. See Note, supra note 171, at 605..
196. See Chiicky, 108 S. Ct. at 2468, 2469. The Court did, however, note that the remedies
Congress provided were "meaningful." Id. at 2470.
197. See Bush, 462 U.S. at 378.
198. See Chilicky, 108 S. Ct. at 2471 n.3 (declining to discuss whether Congress had
"explicitly precluded the creation of a Bivens remedy for respondents' claims").

199. Bush, 462 U.S. at 384.
200. Chilicky, 108 S. Ct. at 2469 (Congress "chose specific forms and levels of protection
for the rights of persons affected.").
201. Kotarski v. Cooper, 799 F.2d 1342, 1354 (9th Cir. 1986) (Hall, J., dissenting), vacated
and remanded, 108 S. Ct. 2861 (1988).
202. E.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S.. 1,
14-15 (1981). At times the Court relies on legislative history, see Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner,
and Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
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construction. Chilicky contains another technique of statutory construction:
plumbing the legislative history in search of indications that Congress wanted
its remedies to be exclusive. 203 As usual, 2 different
members of the Court
4
disagree on how to interpret that history. 0
It is as if the matter had been turned into solely an article I problem.
As argued above, there are other ways of respecting the authority of
Congress without sacrificing the judiciary's important role in Bivens matters. 205 What I have referred to as the "Bivens problem"-how to reconcile
the presence of concurrent enforcement schemes-flows largely from the
ambiguities in the original decision. No subsequent decision has clarified
those ambiguities. Without recasting Bivens the Court must tread a fine
line between its constitutional side, which emphasizes the judiciary, and its
common law side, which emphasizes the legislature. I do not think that this
is an impossible or an undesirable task. The current Court, however, has
largely abandoned it, viewing Bivens remedies as a legislative matter and
the statute preeminent. To this extent the Bivens dissenters' fundamental
premise has been accepted.
IV.

BENS AND FEDERAL COMMON LAW ANALYSIS

A.

Rejection of the Constitutionalist View

The view that Bivens is constitutional law in the sense of being compelled
by the document itself, fairly interpreted, has attracted some academic
support. 206 As discussed above, it is a somewhat stretched reading of Bivens
itself, let alone subsequent cases. The principal problem for proponents of
the constitutionalist position is the extent to which the Court has, from the
outset, uncoupled the question of remedies from that of the right. Remedies
fluctuate; rights do not. The emphasis on Congress' role and even superiority
in determining when and how courts should award relief for constitutional
violations is sharply at variance with the judicial role in the elaboration of

203. See Chilicky, 108 S. Ct. at 2469 (noting expression of regret by one legislator that
remedies did not go further).
204. Id. at 2476-77 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
205. See supra text accompanying notes 187-97.
206. E.g., Schrock & Welsh, supra note 178, at 1135-36. Dellinger, supra note 60; see Hill,
supra note 190, at 1113, 1149, 1157. The Court, on the other hand, does not appear to regard
the constitutional analysis as particularly relevant. In Bush, Justice Stevens stated that if the
matter were one of first impression the Court might proceed in either of two ways. It "might
adopt the common law approach to the judicial recognition of new causes of action and hold
that it is the province of the judiciary to fashion an adequate remedy for every wrong that
can be proved." Or the Court might require statutory authorization. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S.
367, 373 (1983) (footnote omitted). Neither approach sounds like the constitutional reading.
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constitutional rights. If Bivens is not constitutional law as that term is
normally used, then where does it fit within the legal system?
B.

Bivens as Some Form of Federal Common Law

The most frequent response has been to treat Bivens as an example of
federal common law. Although Erie Railroad v. Tonpkins2°7 raised doubts
about the power of federal courts to fashion common law, various forms
of federal common law have developed and indeed flourished since that
decision.20 The general view is that these are enclaves29 within a system
which is predominantly governed by state law. Federal common law is found
in a number of discrete areas linked by the common themes of the presence
of a federal interest, 210 and the need for federal, as opposed to state, law
to protect that interest. The federal courts supply the law because Congress
has not done so, although it obviously could. 211 The source of the federal
courts' own authority is not always clear, 2 2 although there is generally some
21 3
attempt to tie it to a constitutional or statutory provision.
What might be called ordinary federal common law is generally developed
in areas involving "federal 'proprietary' interests"21 4 or "issues affecting
the functioning of the United States government. ' 21 5 As Professor Redish
states, "[t]he most extensive development of federal common law has come
in cases which directly implicate the interests of the United States government. 21 6 The leading case is Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States217 in
which the Court fashioned federal common law to govern a dispute between
the United States and a bank over a check, issued for services under a
federal program and subsequently stolen and fraudulently endorsed. The
Court apparently derived its authority from Congress' exercise of its constitutional function in setting up the underlying program. 218 No specific
legislation dealing with rights and duties concerning checks nor legislative

207. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
208. See M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL
POWER 84-85 (1980).
209. Field, supra note 15, at 885. It should be stressed that Professor Field rejects any

enclavist notions in favor of a generalized approach to federal common law.
210. M. REDISH, supra note 208, at 80.
211. See, e.g., United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
212. Field, supra note 15, at 886.
213. M. REDISH, supra note 208, at 81.
214. Id. at 80 (citing Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional
Preemption, 67 CoLUM. L. REv. 1024-25 (1967)).

215. Id. at 81 n.11 (citing Note, Federal Common Law and Interstate Pollution, 85 HARv.
L. REv. 1439, 1444-45 (1972)).
216. Id. at 85.
217. 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
218. Clearfield, 318 U.S. at 366-67.
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authorization for judicial creation of such law existed. Whatever its doctrinal
weaknesses, Clearfieldhas been read broadly for the proposition that federal
courts can fashion the law incident to federal programs, although the inroads
219
on Erie have been somewhat tempered by frequent deference to state law.
The Court does not appear to have moved to a position of treating Bivens
as nothing more than Clearfieldtype federal common law, although it may
try. There is a relevant federal program under which the defendant official
operates. Congress may be able to overturn the Court's final decision. On
the other hand, the major federal common law question-whether to displace
state law-is of limited importance at best. More importantly, the Constitution is so important in Bivens cases that one must consider whether they
represent something more than ordinary federal common law, a so-called
higher breed of the species.
C.

Bivens as ConstitutionalCommon Law

Justice Rehnquist has described the Bivens doctrine as "constitutional
common law.'' 22 This striking phrase raises the question of how any legal
doctrine can be both things at the same time. The classic treatment and
defense of federal constitutional common law is Professor Monaghan's. 22'
According to Monaghan, not everything the court does in the name of the
Constitution is classic Marbury-style constitutional law. 22 It also fashions
an extensive "substructure of substantive, procedural and remedial rules
drawing their inspiration and authority from, but not required by, various
constitutional provisions. "22 A principal issue for Monaghan is establishing
the Court's authority to develop such a body of law, given the premise that
it is not constitutionally compelled. He views it as a variant of the types
of federal common law discussed: judicial formulation of rules as a matter
of first resort, with Congress' role being that of a potential subsequent
reviser rather than the initial lawmaker.2 4 Because the various enclaves2
of federal common law represent an exception within the legal system, the
Court must be able to point to a nonjudicial source which authorizes their
formulation. For Monaghan, the crucial point is that the Constitution can
be such a source every bit as much as a statute.m Thus, in the context of
the Bill of Rights, the Court has created "a sizable body of constitutionally

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

E.g., Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. 715.
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 53 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Monaghan, supra note 114.
Id.at 2-3.
Id.
Id.at 10-11.

225. Id. at 15.

226. Id.at 13.
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inspired implementing rules whose only sources are constitutional provisions
' 227
framed as limitations on government.
Monaghan treats Bivens as an example of this constitutional common
law. 228 He rejects the constitutional interpretation of the case, although he
does characterize it as "an explicit recognition that the constitutional guarantee embraces a right of action."2 9 The remedial issue is separate and,
apparently, open to legislative action. This conclusion leads us to the second
major component of the Monaghan thesis: a substantial role for Congress
in amplifying and altering the initial rules laid down by the Court.230
Monaghan has been criticized for his willingness to allow the potentially
dangerous legislative branch into the domain where judicial protection from
legislatures is essential. 23' He may also be criticized for being ambiguous as
to who should have the last word. At times he suggests that the need for
adequate constitutional remedies reserves that say for the Court.2 2 At other
times he suggests that Congress has the same power to change constitutional
common law as it would any other form of federal common law.233 In the
end, he suggests that the high degree of deference which the Court would
234
show to Congress renders the point almost moot.
Whatever its shortcomings, the Monaghan thesis is an extremely helpful
way of looking at Bivens. Treating the matter as one of ordinary federal
common law is obviously unrealistic, given the extent to which the constitution is in the foreground as the source of the primary rights and duties.
At the same time, by stopping short of a purely constitutional reading, it
allows for the expansive congressional role which has developed. It appears
to fit with the reading of Bivens offered above, 235 under which the Constitution provides a cause of action with specific rights and duties but flexibility
as to remedies. A constitutional common law analysis may have the disadvantage of not clearly answering the question of which branch has the
last word-to what extent, if any, the Court can review what Congress
provides-but the Court has not done so either.
Furthermore, I think that the constitutional common law thesis is consistent with the narrow view of the special factors exception argued for in this
article. Special factors should be special, as opposed to generally present.
Monaghan emphasizes the Court's competence and generally accepted role

227. Id. at 19.
228. Id. at 23-24.
229. Id. at 24 n.125. Included in the right of action is enforceability "by any appropriate
remedy including damages." Id.
230. Id. at 18-30.
231. Schrock & Welsh, supra note 178, at 1152-53.
232. Monaghan, supra note 114, at 21 n.1l1, 26.
233. Id. at 29, 31.
234. Id. at 42 n.217.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 207-16.
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in implementing guarantees of individual rights. 2 6 This suggests a presumptive approach to Bivens remedies and a clear statement requirement for a
finding that Congress has displaced them. At the same time, recognition of
Congress' role allows for some degree of deference to what it has provided.
This may sound like trying to have it both ways (a criticism that has been
levelled against Monaghan)237 but that is inherent in the Bivens problem of
what to do when Congress has spoken. Monaghan, then, provides a framework for considering that problem. Recent federal courts scholarship provides an even broader framework, and also focuses attention on a specific
question which cases such as Chilicky raise: To what extent should implication of Bivens remedies from the Constitution be viewed as identical to
implying private rights of action from federal statutes?
D.
The Generalist View of Federal Common Law and the
Dubious Analogy Between Bivens and Implied Rights of Action.
In two important recent articles, Professors Field and Merrill advance
what might be called a generalized approach to lawmaking by federal
courts.23s Their thesis is that constitutional adjudication, statutory interpretation, and what is narrowly referred to as federal common law, share
sufficient characteristics that they can all be treated as federal common law
in a broad sense. Professor Field defines the term to mean "any rule of
federal law created by a court (usually but not invariably a federal court)
when the substance of that rule is not clearly suggested by federal enactments-constitutional or congressional. ' 23 9 An authoritative text, either the
Constitution or a statute,2m must give the federal courts power to make
law, but once they have it, "judges [possess] great freedom to make federal
common law where they will." 241 Professor Merrill's definition of federal
common law is similar: "any federal rule of decision that is not mandated
on the face of some authoritative federal text-whether or not that rule can
be described as the product of 'interpretation' in either a conventional or

an unconventional sense.' '242
These propositions may seem startling at first, but they rest on a number
of important insights. Constitutional adjudication, for example, can rarely
be tied directly to the words of the text or the framers' specific intentions.2 3

236. Monaghan, supra note 114, at 18, 35.
237. See generally Schrock & Welsh, supra note 178.
238. Field, supra note 15; Merrill, supra note 15.
239. Field, supra note 15, at 890 (emphasis in original).
,240. Id. at 888.
241. Id. at 929.
242. Merrill, supra note 15, at 5 (emphasis in original).
243. Id. at 2 (discussing prominence of "noninterpretative" or "nonoriginalist" theories of
judicial review).
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Statutory interpretation, as well, frequently shades into an attempt by courts
to further generalized policy goals through judicial action. 2" Both involve
the use of the panoply of common law techniques, as does, of course, the
formulation of federal common law itself, as that term is normally used.2 5
A particular advantage of this perspective is that it helps explain the
importance of precedent-the quintessential common law tool-in the development of constitutional law.246
What is important, for present purposes, is that both Field and Merrill
seize on similarities between Bivens remedies and implying private rights of
action from federal statutes as a specific illustration of their general thesis.
Professor Field is even petulant about the matter, wondering "how long"
it will take the Court to see the light, 247 and expressing the "hope that the
... dichotomy between constitutional and statutory remedies will be forgotten and that the same process of reasoning from the federal enactment
in its context, including the policies behind it and the purposes of its
framers, will come to be seen as dominating the inquiry in both situa2
tions." 48
In other words, each task-granting a Bivens remedy and implying a
private right of action from a statute that does not provide one-involves
a similar exercise in federal judicial lawmaking, the fashioning of federal
common law.249 It is true that in each case neither text speaks to the question
of remedies, although the statute normally contains provisions for administrative enforcement. It is also true that the Court, particularly in Bivens,
has at times suggested that the two inquiries are similar.2 0 However, it
stated otherwise in Davis v. Passman,25' and it is the Davis dichotomy which
Field and Merrill criticize.
Still, there are several reasons why I think their equation fails. At the
outset there is the common sense notion that the Constitution and federal
statutes are simply different. It is not just that the Constitution does not
"partake of the prolixity of a legal code, ' 25 2 although that is part of it.
Statutes generally prescribe remedial mechanisms. The Constitution does
not. More importantly, we expect the courts to play a broad role in enforcing

244. P. BATOR, P. MismN, D. SHAPiRo & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER's THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND TiE FEDERAL SYSTEM 770 (2d ed. 1973).

245. In Clearfield, for example, Justice Douglas' opinion cited federal cases, state cases,
English law, and a treatise in deciding a point of commercial law.
246. Merrill, supra note 15, at 69-70.
247. Field, supra note 15, at 889 n.26.

248. Id.
249. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 15, at 49-50.

250. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
396 (1971) (Brennan, J.), 402, 407 (Harlan, J., concurring).
251. 442 U.S. 228, 241-42 (1979).
252. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 407 (1819), quoted in Davis, 442 U.S. at 241.
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it. "Under our accepted traditions and governing political theory, the judicial
branch has the final say as to the meaning of the Constitution, and it is
therefore appropriate for the Supreme Court to develop the remedies which,
in its opinion, most effectively enforce the constraints of the Constitution."2 3
Statutes, on the other hand, come from Congress which may have decided
the remedial mechanism it wants as part of the bargain and trade necessary
to get the statute passed in the first place. As Justice Scalia states, the
remedial mechanism is a "separate" and "significant" part of the statute.s2
Treating the two problems as equal attempts to piggyback an activist
approach to implied statutory rights onto the legitimacy of Bivens. In part,
of course, Professors Field and Merrill are simply at odds with the current
Court's reluctance to imply rights of action from federal statutes.2 6 That
reluctance is grounded in notions of separation of powers which also have
a good deal of common sense appeal.2 7 In evaluating judicial remedies in
the constitutional context, the inertia ought to be with the courts, unless
Congress has spoken with some force, perhaps expressly. In the statutory
context, the inertia may well lie with no additional remedy beyond what is
in the statute. Both Field and Merrill recognize that a court must derive its
authority from the relevant text. The argument here is that the Constitution
and statutes are very different sorts of texts.
One can support the current Court's restrictive approach to implied
statutory rights of action, as I do,2 8 while criticizing its restrictive approach
to Bivens. But if Field and Merrill are right, maybe this approach is right
too. After all, Congress has spoken. Professor Merrill seems to suggest that
Congress' provision of an adequate remedy would deprive the federal courts
of power to entertain a Bivens action.2 9 Even if one does not go this far,
the generalist thesis appears to track the current Court in focusing on the
legislative dimension of the Bivens problem. After all, the more one calls
it federal common law, the stronger the implication that Congress can take
away the Bivens remedy simply by acting. 260

253. M.

REDISH,

FEDERAL COURTS 130 (Supp. 1986).

254. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 748 n.19 (1979) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
255. Thompson v. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. 513, 523 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring).
256. E.g., Field, supra note 15, at 931-32 n.220 (rejecting Justice Powell's critique of implied
rights of action based on separation of powers); Merrill, supra note 15, at 53 (The Supreme
Court has been "too restrictive with respect to judicially created remedies for statutory
violations."). At the same time, he characterizes the early Bivens decisions as "too expansive."
Id.
257. See Brown, Of Activism and Erie-The Implication Doctrine's Implications for the
Nature and Role of the FederalCourts, 69 IowA L. REv. 617, 648-49 (1984).
258. Id.
259. Merrill, supra note 15, at 53.
260. Professor Field attempts to avoid the dilemma by the following analysis: "Congress
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That is perhaps the ultimate irony of the Field-Merrill thesis: the creation

of strange bedfellows between academics who favor judicial lawmaking
(Merrill's enthusiasm is more tempered) and a conservative, anti-federal
common law Court that wants to restrict it. If Bivens and implied rights
analysis are the same thing, one could say, perversely, that the Court has
bought the Field-Merrill thesis and is treating them the same way. However,
it denies both. In this respect, it is striking that the Chiticky opinion,
denying a Bivens remedy, utilized the very reasoning that Justice Powell

first invoked in favor of a restrictive approach to implied rights of action:
"At each step, Congress chose specific forms and levels of protection for
the rights of persons affected . . . . At no point did Congress choose to

extend to any person the kind of remedies that [plaintiffs] seek in this
lawsuit.' '261Perhaps federal common law analyses of Bivens have their limits
after all.
CONCLUSION

As the passage just quoted from Chilicky shows, the Court is moving
closer and closer to treating the availability of Bivens remedies as a legislative
question. If any statute can preclude the courts, then the statutory tail has
come to wag the constitutional dog. So far, outside the military field at
least, the cases have arisen in contexts where Congress has provided some
remedy. Thus the Court has been able to deny plaintiffs access to federal
courts without denying the existence of initial federal judicial power to
redress their grievances. It has not embraced the ultimate conclusion of the
Bivens dissenters. It has, however, accepted many of their premises about
legislative competence and legislative power. In my view, there are ways to
respect congressional competence and authority short of this abdication. Of
course, the Court's opinion in Bivens itself sowed many of the seeds of this
harvest. Finally, I do not mean to suggest that the advocates of a generalized
approach to federal common law intend to provide intellectual support for

always has power to alter a federal common law rule that is not constitutionally based.
Moreover, even common law inferred from constitutional provisions is not always beyond
Congress' power to change. But Congress sometimes lacks power to alter common law derived
from the Constitution because sometimes such law is constitutionally required." Field, supra
note 15, at 896 n.60 (emphasis added). It is not clear that calling rules "compelled by the
Constitution," id. at 892-93 n.42, federal common law fits within her general emphasis on the
judge making that law outside the clear text of any governing instrument. For example, she
distinguishes between a rule being "a product of judicial creativity" as opposed to "more
direct constitutional or statutory interpretation." Id. at 894. All of this may simply illustrate
the pitfalls of a general theory which attempts to do away with enclavism.
261. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 108 S. Ct. 2460, 2469 (1988). See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 748 n.19
(1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) (danger that courts "may dramatically revise the balance of
interests struck by . . . legislation.").
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what the Court is doing. But in equating statutory issues with constitutional
ones they do just that. In treating Bivens plaintiffs the same way it treats
statutory plaintiffs, the Court has adopted a course of action urged in
another context: Just say no.

